Financial Aspects of the United States Pension System by Benjamin M. Friedman
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Financial Aspects of the United States Pension System
Volume Author/Editor: Zvi Bodie and John B. Shoven, editors




Chapter Title: Pension Funding, Pension Asset Allocation, and Corporate
Finance: Evidence from Individual Company Data
Chapter Author: Benjamin M. Friedman
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6030
Chapter pages in book: (p. 107 - 152)5  Pension Funding, 
Pension Asset Allocation, 
and Corporate Finance: 
Evidence from Individual 
Company Data 
Benjamin M. Friedman 
Private pension funds now constitute one of  the largest pools of  invest- 
ment assets in the United States. Their total assets exceed $300 billion, 
and for the foreseeable future they are almost certain to grow still further 
in  relation  to the overall size of  the United States financial  markets. 
These funds already comprise by far the largest major category of  institu- 
tional investor in the United States corporate equity market and the 
second largest (after the life insurance industry) in the corporate bond 
market. As private  pension funds continue  to account for a steadily 
growing share of these key markets, their behavior becomes increasingly 
important to the understanding of  how the United States financial mar- 
kets determine the yields on, and prices of, financial assets. 
At the same time, both the assets held by private pension plans and 
these plans’ liabilities for future benefit payments are now large-and 
growing-in  relation to the nonpension assets and liabilities of the United 
States private business sector. Many major corporations’ pension assets 
and pension liabilities represent substantial fractions of  the net worth of 
the company, and in some cases even bulk large in comparison to the 
company’s total assets. Because corporate equity shares therefore repre- 
sent ownership claims on two pools of assets, and obligations via two sets 
of liabilities, shareholders clearly have a direct interest in the company’s 
pension plan in addition to the quantities that appear on its balance sheet. 
The larger are the assets and liabilities of  the company’s pension plan, the 
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greater is their role, along with the nonpension assets and liabilities, in 
determining  the sponsoring  company’s  overall  risk-return  prospects. 
Hence private pension plans increasingly matter not just for employees 
but  for  corporations’  shareholders and, in  the event  of  default, for 
corporations’ creditors. 
The growing importance  of  pension plans’ assets and  liabilities for 
nearly all constituencies within a typical corporation raises the possibility 
that the corporation’s overall financial position and prospects may in- 
fluence its strategy for funding its pension liabilities, as well as its subse- 
quent allocation of  these funds among alternative investment assets, in 
any of a number of ways. Companies may use unfunded pension liabili- 
ties as a substitute for credit market debt, or to extend overall indebted- 
ness in conjunction with credit market debt. Similarly, companies may 
invest pension assets so as to mitigate, or to compound. the leverage and 
other risk-determining characteristics of their business. Then, too, there 
may  be  no connection  at all-perhaps  because  managements  feel  a 
responsibility to subordinate the corporation’s interest in its pension plan 
to the interests of  the plan’s beneficiaries. 
Moreover, as private pension assets and liabilities continue to grow in 
relation to the balance sheet of the typical corporation, the possibility 
arises that the connection between corporate finance and pensions may 
be as relevant for understanding the former as the latter. If  companies 
face limitations on the management of their pension assets and liabilities 
(as they do under the 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security Act), 
or if  the treatment for tax purposes  of  any specific asset  or liability 
depends on whether if  falls within  the pension  (as it does under the 
current United States Tax Code), then the desired positioning of  the 
company’s  consolidated  pension  plan  and balance  sheet  may  not  be 
attainable solely through actions executed in the pension plan. In such 
circumstances companies may take at least some features of  (or con- 
straints on) the pension  plan  as given in  making  decisions about the 
structure of their other assets and liabilities. More generally, a company 
may act so as to determine the structure of its pension plan and that of its 
balance sheet jointly. 
The object of  this chapter is to test empirically for interrelationships 
along just these lines between United States corporations’ management 
of their pension plans and their management of the more familiar aspects 
of corporate financial structure. One motivation underlying this effort is 
to subject to empirical scrutiny some of  the theoretical hypotheses that 
have already emerged in the nascent literature of private pensions and 
corporate finance. In addition, the goal is to examine the data more 
broadly, to allow other regularities to appear which may be suggestive in 
the further development of theory describing these aspects of corpora- 
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Because of the overwhelming heterogeneity of  both pension arrange- 
ments and financial structure within the United States  corporate business 
sector, and because of  the profusion of powerful economic, regulatory, 
and  other institutional  influences that have  shaped  the pension  and 
general corporate financial environments in recent years, any attempt to 
conduct such an investigation using aggregated time-series data would be 
of  limited value. Instead, the analysis undertaken here relies on indi- 
vidual company data assembled from the pension plan information that 
each plan  sponsor provides to the Internal Revenue Service and the 
United States Department of  Labor on Form 5500, used in conjunction 
with additional conventional individual company financial statistics con- 
tained in the Standard and Poor’s Compustat file. The pension data are 
for plan year 1977, the only year for which a nearly complete Form 5500 
file exists as of the time of writing. 
Section 5.1 describes the data and indicates the procedures used for 
such steps as within-firm aggregation of multiple pension plans, merging 
of the Form 5500 and Compustat files, and treatment of corporate parent- 
subsidiary relationships. Section 5.2, which focuses on pension funding 
strategy, presents the results of a series of tests for relationships between 
corporations’ funding of  their pension  liabilities (the total of  which is 
taken as given here) and other characteristics  of  the respective  firms’ 
business and balance  sheet (also taken as given). Section 5.3, also on 
pension funding strategy, digresses to examine the results of tests of the 
familiar  hypothesis  that  corporations’  decisions  in  this  regard  are 
oriented not to achieving fundamental  financial objectives but to smooth- 
ing their reported earnings statements over time.  Section 5.4, which 
focuses on pension asset allocations, presents the results of a series of 
tests for relationships between corporations’ investment of their pension 
assets (the total of which is taken as given here) and other characteristics 
of the firms’ business and balance sheet (also taken as given). Section 5.5 
generalizes the line of investigation pursued in section 5.2  by presenting 
results of tests for a joint relationship between pension funding strategy 
and the corporation’s balance sheet, thereby allowing for the possibility 
that balance sheet decisions may not be predetermined with respect to 
pension funding decisions. Section 5.6 briefly summarizes the chapter’s 
principal conclusions, highlights some important caveats, and indicates 
directions for potential future research. 
5.1  The Data 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of  1974 requires each 
pension benefit plan sponsored by a United States corporation to file a 
report annually, with the Internal Revenue Service and the Department 
of  Labor, on Form 5500 (or Form 5500-C if the plan covers 100 or fewer 110  Benjamin M. Friedman 
participants).  The form includes information about the plan’s benefit 
structure, income and expenses for the year, beginning-of-year and end- 
of-year assets broken down into a substantial detail of investment cate- 
gories, and the number and current status of participants in the plan. 
Each defined-benefit plan must also file Form 5500 Schedule B, which 
provides actuarial information about the plan’s accrued liabilities, includ- 
ing its vested  and nonvested liabilities separately, together with other 
related items. The Appendix shows the format of  Form 5500 and Sched- 
ule B. 
The 1977 Employee Benefit Plan Sample File contains all 29,120 Form 
5500 returns submitted for plan year 1977 and processed by the Internal 
Revenue Service between July 1,1978,  and June 30,1979.’  Those returns 
constituted 77.5% of the Form 5500 returns ultimately submitted for plan 
year 1977. The 22.5% of the returns that are missing from the file are 
heavily concentrated among smaller plans (as measured by asset size), 
however.’  Of  the 29,120 returns included in the file, 4,694 either per- 
tained to plans sponsored by nonprofit organizations or reported zero 
assets. The remaining 24,426 returns form the basic sample used in this 
chapter. 
Table 5.1  shows the distribution of assets across this sample of 24,426 
plans. The combined assets for all 24,426 totaled $222 billion.’ The great 
majority of  this $222 billion was concentrated in a small fraction of  the 
plans. Nearly one-half of  the plans had less than $1 million in assets, and 
more than four-fifths had less than $5 million. By contrast, the 22 plans 
with more than $1 billion in assets together accounted for almost one-fifth 
of  the total, and the 55 plans  with  more than  $500 million  together 
accounted for almost ~ne-third.~ 
Because many companies sponsor more than one pension plan-one 
plan for salaried staff and another for wage earners, for example-the 
24,426 plans  in  the sample  represented only  15,098 sponsoring cor- 
poration~.~  For purposes of  testing hypotheses about relationships be- 
tween pension asset and liability  decisions and corporate financial be- 
havior in the conventional sense, what presumably  matters is  not the 
assets or liabilities of any one of a corporation’s pension plans but the 
combined assets and liabilities of  all plans that it sponsors. Table 5.2 
shows the distribution of  the $222 billion in total assets across the 15,098 
sponsoring firms in the sample. As one might  expect, aggregating all 
plans sponsored  by  a single firm shifts the distribution toward  larger 
assets for each observation, although the effect is quantitatively small. 
The most common form of  pension plan in the United States is the 
defined-benefit plan, but other forms (primarily the defined-contribution 
plan) exist as well. The distinction is relevant because the concept of 
pension “liabilities” has meaning only for defined-benefit plans. For the 
same  reason, shareholders in  a  corporation  have  no  direct  financial Table 5.1  Asset Distribution of Disaggregated Sample: All For-Profit Sponsors 
Distribution of  Plans  Distribution of  Assets 
Cumulative  Cumulative  Cumulative  Cumulative 




































































































Nofe: Asset size categories are in millions of dollars; asset amounts are in billions of  dollars. Table 5.2  Asset  Distribution of Aggregated Sample: All For-Profit Sponsors 
Distribution of  Sponsors 
Cumulative  Cumulative  Cumulative  Cumulative 
Distribution of  Assets 
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interest in how the assets of  a defined-contribution plan perform. Of the 
24,426 plans in  table 5.  I, 16,200 sponsored by  10,470 different com- 
panies, and with $165 billion in assets, were defined-benefit plans. Never- 
theless, 856 of these plans failed to file Schedule B in time €or  the Internal 
Revenue Service to process it, along with the corresponding Form 5500 
return, before June 30, 1979. The remaining 15,344 plans, sponsored by 
9,899 companies, reported $152 billion  in combined assets. Table 5.3 
shows the distribution of these assets across the 9,899 firms. 
The information contained in Form 5500 is insufficient, of  course, to 
facilitate tests of  hypotheses about relationships between pension asset 
and liability decisions and corporate finance decisions in the conventional 
sense.  Some source of  information about each sponsoring company’s 
balance sheet, as well as its income statement and other aspects of its 
financial situation, is also necessary. Because many of  the 15,098 com- 
panies sponsoring pension plans included in the 1977 Form 5500 sample 
are either small or closely held, however, obtaining such information on a 
comprehensive basis would be impractical if  not impossible. By contrast, 
most of  the larger companies are included in the Standard and Poor’s 
Compustat file. A systematic search, based on a computer procedure 
supplemented with “by hand” inspection, revealed  1,690 corporations 
included in the Compustat file that were sponsors of  5,788 pension plans 
included in the 1977 Form 5500 sample.‘ 
Even so, simply matching Compustat firms with pension plan sponsors 
would still be inadequate. The Compustat file reports balance sheets and 
earnings statements for  each included  corporation  on a consolidated 
basis-that  is,  including  all  of  the  corporation’s wholly  owned  sub- 
sidiaries. From the perspective of analyzing corporate financial behavior 
at the level of the relationships posited in this investigation, consolidation 
is  presumably the correct procedure. Matching  Compustat firms with 
pension  plan  sponsors would  be  inadequate, therefore, without  also 
consolidating plans sponsored by each Compustat firm with plans spon- 
sored by its subsidiaries (if any). A laborious “by hand” search revealed 
that 593 Compustat firms were sponsors-not  directly but through sub- 
sidiaries-of  2,040 pension plans included in the 1977  Form 5500 sample.’ 
Of  the 593 Compustat firms  sponsoring pension  plans  through  sub- 
sidiaries, 447 also sponsored one or more plans directly. 
The fully  aggregated  and  consolidated  sample available  for  use  in 
testing for relationships between pension decisions and corporate finan- 
cial decisions therefore consists of 7,828 pension plans (including defined- 
benefit as well as other plans, and, among defined-benefit plans, those 
that did and did not file Schedule B), with $153 billion in combined assets, 
sponsored by  1,836 consolidated companiesR  Table 5.4 shows the dis- 
tribution of this $153 billion of assets across the 1,836 firms. Of  the 7,828 
plans sponsored by consolidated Compustat companies, 5,836 were de- Table 5.3  Asset Distribution of Aggregated Sample: Defined-Benefit Plans Only 
Distribution of  Sponsors 
Cumulative  Cumulative  Cumulative  Cumulative 
Distribution of  Assets 




































































































Note:  Asset size categories are in millions of  dollars; asset amounts are in billions of  dollars Table 5.4  Asset Distribution of  Aggregated and Consolidated Sample: All Compustat Sponsors 
Distribution of  Sponsors  Distribution of  Assets 
Cumulative  Cumulative  Cumulative  Cumulative 













































































































Nore:  Asset size categories are in millions of  dollars; asset amounts are in billions of  dollars Table 5.5  Asset Distribution of Aggregated Sample: Defined-Benefit Plans Only, All Compustat Sponsors 
Distribution of  Sponsors  Distribution of  Assets 
Cumulative  Cumulative  Cumulative  Cumulative 
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fined-benefit plans, of  which 5,670 filed Schedule B in time for Internal 
Revenue Service processing. Table 5.5 shows the distribution of  these 
5,670 plans’ $1  10 billion of assets across the plans’ 1,552  sponsoring firms. 
A comparison of tables 5.2 and 5.4, and of tables 5.3 and 5.5, shows that 
the result of not only consolidating subsidiaries into  parent companies but 
also excluding all plans not sponsored by a Compustat firm (even through 
a  subsidiary) is  to shift  the distribution  further toward  larger  dollar 
amounts per company.y 
5.2  Pension Funding Strategy 
In the most abstract conception of the incorporated firm, the assets and 
liabilities of a corporation’s defined-benefit pension plan(s) are just like 
the assets and liabilities that appear on its balance sheet. Shareholders 
own both sets of assets, and they are responsible (to the extent of their 
equity) for both sets of  liabilities. Whether the firm’s management acts so 
as to maximize  the share price,  to maximize  expected profits,  or to 
achieve yet some other objective, there is no need to distinguish between 
one pool of assets and the other or between one group of  liabilities and 
the other. 
Such an abstraction may fail to describe the world of  United States 
corporations and their sponsored pension plans for several well-known 
reasons.”’  At the most practical level, the firm’s flexibility on the pension 
liability  side is usually  severely limited. Conventions of  labor market 
practice, reinforced by legal requirements and often by collective bar- 
gaining agreements, restrict the range within which a firm and its workers 
can divide total labor costs between current and deferred compensation. 
To the extent that the firm’s basic pension liabilities are predetermined 
from the perspective of financial decision making, therefore, its choice of 
pension “liabilities”  in  this context refers only to that part of  the basic 
actuarial liability  in  excess of  the amount of  assets committed to the 
pension fund. Hence decisions about pension “liabilities” in this sense 
are really decisions about pension assets. Moreover, the firm’s flexibility 
is  limited  here, too, in  that its  pension  fundipg position  must  meet 
standards specified by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.” 
Wholly apart from such constraints, a variety of considerations may 
lead the firm to see pension  assets and liabilities as less than perfect 
substitutes for its other assets and liabilities. First, the implicit cost of 
“borrowing”  by  less than fully funding pension liabilities need not be 
identical, either before or after taxes, to the explicit cost of borrowing in 
the credit market. In the extreme, the former “source of  funds” may be 
available at times when the latter is not. Even under ordinary circum- 
stances, the scheduling of  the “debt service”  associated with the two 
kinds of  liabilities may differ in important ways. A second distinction is 118  Benjamin M. Friedman 
that pension liabilities, unlike the firm’s other liabilities in most circum- 
stances, are insured in a way that limits the firm’s exposure. The Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation insures corporations’ pension  liabilities 
in full but, in the event of default, has a claim on only one-third of the 
firm’s assets. The tax treatment of  pension plans provides a third reason 
why the simple abstraction, in which one asset or liability is just like any 
other, may not apply to actual corporations. Payments of funds into the 
pension plan are deductible from the firm’s income for tax purposes, and 
earnings on assets held in the pension plan are excluded from taxable 
income. Finally-although  these four factors do not exhaust the possible 
reasons  for  distinguishing  pension  versus  other  assets  and  liabili- 
ties-shareholders  and potential shareholders may be more fully aware 
of  that part of  a firm’s liabilities which actually appears on its balance 
sheet.’* 
For all of  these familiar reasons,  therefore, a corporation  may not 
behave as if it is indifferent between pension and other assets, or between 
pension  and other liabilities.  Hence, instead  of  the usual  net  worth 
constraint, 
(1)  TA -  TL = NW, 
where TA and TL are the firm’s total assets and total liabilities, respec- 
tively, and hW  is net worth (assumed to be predetermined as of  any 
specific time), the more relevant expression is 
(2)  PA + BA -  PL -  BL  = NW, 
where  PA  and PL distinguish the assets and liabilities of  the firms’s 
defined-benefit pension plan(s), while BA and BL represent the assets 
and liabilities that appear on the firm’s balance ~heet.’~ 
If  the firm were  free to choose simultaneously  each of  these  four 
quantities, subject only to the net worth constraint, then its consolidated 
“portfolio”  behavior would take the familiar form 
r  1 
where X is a vector of  external factors determining the firm’s responses, a 
is a vector of  coefficients summing to unity, and B is a matrix of  coef- 
ficients with zero column sums. The most familiar empirical application 
of  this conception is in a time-series context, in which X  would include 
primarily (often exclusively) the expected yields on the respective assets 
and liabilities. By contrast, in a cross-section context the elements of X 
are firm-specific factors that are taken to be predetermined with respect 119  Pension Funding, Asset Allocation, and Corporate Finance 
to the firm’s portfolio choice in the one time period under observation, 
and that (at least potentially) influence that choice. To the extent that 
some of the firm’s portfolio choices are predetermined with respect to 
others, however, some of the elements within the left-hand side of (3) 
belong more properly on the right. If the firm decides on its pension assets 
and liabilities only secondarily, after deciding on its other liabilities, then 
PA and PL may depend on BA and BL as well as the other factors 
included within X. 
One question that immediately arises in this context is whether firms 
have fixed targets for their total liabilities (PL  + BL)  so that they take on 
fewer pension liabilities as they have more liabilities on their balance 
sheets or, alternatively,  whether they systematically use  PL and BL 
together to achieve greater or smaller total leverage. Put in another way, 
the question is  whether the firm  treats pension  liabilities  and  other 
liabilities as substitutes or complements, although the sense of substitut- 
ability versus complementarity involved here differs somewhat from the 
usual one in which vector X includes specific time-varying yields associ- 
ated with PL and BL. 
The evidence  from  the  1977 Form 5500  sample  is  consistent  with 
complementarity of PL and BL  in this sense. Estimating the cross-section 
regression 
(4) 
BL  -a+y-  PL 
NW  NW 
-- 
for the sample of  all consolidated Compustat firms with defined-benefit 
plans filing Schedule B yields y = .17, with t-statistic 7.8 (R2  = .04).14  For 
the subsample in which each firm’s pension plan is sufficiently important 
in its overall structure that pension liabilities amount to at least 3% of the 
firm’s total assets, the result is y = .26, with t-statistic 6.4(R2  = .07). For 
the further subsample in which PLITA 2 .lo, the result is y = SO,  with 
t-statistic 7.9 (R2  = .17). 
Further analysis that controls for other influences in the spirit of (3), 
while maintaining the assumption that BL  is predetermined with respect 
to  PL,  supports this conclusion. Table 5.6 reports estimation results for a 
series of regressions of the form 
BL  PL 
NW  MW 
-  a  + y -  + px  -- 
where Xis, in turn, each of a series of variables describing the firm and its 
operating environment. Once again, the positive relationship between 
pension and other liabilities (both scaled by net worth) holds up regard- 
less of  the choice of additional controlling variables. 
The specific results for the partial effects of  the several controlling 
variables are also interesting in some cases. Neither the growth rate nor 120  Benjamin M. Friedman 
Table 5.6  Relationship between Pension Liabilities and Other Liabilities 
Full Sample  PLITA 2 .10 Subsarnple 
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-  .26 
Note: Results  shown  are  estimated  coefficients  (and  r-statistics)  for  the  regression 
PLiW  = a  + y (BLINW)  + pX, where p(EBIT) = 10-year growth rate of  earnings before 
interest and taxes; o(EBIT)  = 10-year normalized standard deviation of  EBIT around its 
growth trend; EIBA = ratio of earnings to nonpension assets; k(EIBA)  = 10-year mean of 
EIBA;  o(EIBA)  = 10-year standard deviation of  EIBA around p(E/BA);  p(TIE)  = 5-year 
mean of ratio of  taxes paid to before-tax earnings; p(LIS) = 5-year mean of  ratio of  labor 
and related expenses to net sales; and AGE = ratio of  pension plan participants currently 
employed to all plan participants. 
the trend-adjusted  variability of the firm’s earnings had a significant effect 
on its pension  liabilities.  The 1977 rate of  return on assets  affected 
pension liabilities positively, but the mean rate of  return over the past 10 
years did not. The negative effect of the volatility of rate of return was 
marginally significant in the full sample, but not in the subsample with 
large pension liabilities relative to the firm’s total assets. The firm’s tax 
status had no significant effect. As would be expected, the firm’s labor 
intensiveness affected pension liabilities positively, and the fraction of 
the firm’s pension plan participants who were still employed affected 
pension liabilities negatively; but both effects were significant in the full 
sample only. 
The failure of  so many basic  aspects  of  the firm’s risk  and return 
situation to affect its pension liabilities supports the suggestion, made 
above, that the firm does not actually choose PL in the usual portfolio 
sense. Instead, the firm may take PL  as given-by  labor market consid- 
erations, for example-so  that its actual choice in this context is simply 121  Pension Funding, Asset Allocation, and Corporate Finance 
how much of  its pension liabilities to fund. If  the firm were free to choose 
in this context, its portfolio problem would take the form 
1  [  -BL  BA  ]=a+BX. 
NW  -  (PL -  PA) 
Moreover, if  the firm decides only secondarily on its unfunded pension 
liabilities (that is, on its pension assets in this context), then again the 
possibility arises that (PL -  PA)  depends on BA and BL as well as on 
any or all of the other factors included within  X. 
The parallel  question  in  this  context  is  whether firms  with  large 
amounts of debt on their balance sheet choose to  have greater or smaller 
amounts of unfunded liabilities. In this form the question bears a direct 
connection to at least one prominent line of  theoretical analysis of  how 
corporations’ pension funding decisions depend on their financial condi- 
tion.  In  particular,  Sharpe  (1976)  has suggested  that  an  important 
rationale for firms to fund their pension plans less than fully is the value of 
the insurance provided by the Pension  Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
(PBGC).I5 In Sharpe’s analysis the insurance written by  the PBGC is 
equivalent to a put option, and the firm’s incentive is to maximize the 
value of  the put. A major implication of  this line of reasoning is that the 
firms for which the probability of bankruptcy is nontrivial have an incen- 
tive to underfund their pension plans. The more highly levered a firm is, 
therefore-that  is, the larger is BL  relative to NW,  all other considera- 
tions equal-the  greater is the firm’s incentive to underfund its pension 
plan. In terms of  the current analysis, therefore, the Sharpe hypothesis 
suggests that BL  and (PL -  PA)  are complements. 
The evidence from  the  1977 Form 5500 sample  is  consistent  with 
complementarity not only of  BL and PL,  as in (4),  but also of  BL  and 
(PL -  PA).  Hence the data are consistent with Sharpe’s analysis of the 
pension funding decision. Estimating the cross-section regression 
(6) 
(7) 
BL  =a+y- 
NW  NW 
PL -  PA 
for  the full sample yields y = .14,  with t-statistic 10.1  (EL  = .07).I6For  the 
subsample  of  firms  with  PLiTA 2.03, the corresponding  results  are 
y = .25, with  t-statistic  9.3  (R2  = .13).  For the subsample  with  PLI 
TA  2 .lo, the results are y = .44, with t-statistic  10.8(R2  = .27). 
Table 5.7 shows estimation results, comparable to those in table 5.6, 
for a parallel series of regressions 
BL 
NW  NW 
pL-pA =a+y-+px 122  Benjamin M. Friedman 
Table 5.7  Relationship between Unfunded Pension Liabilities and Other 
Liabilities 
Full Sample  PLiTA 2  .10 Subsample 
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-  .37 
(-2.4) 
Note:  Results  shown  are  estimated  coefficients  (and  [-statistics)  for  thc  regression 
(PL -  PA)/NW = a + -y(BL/NW)  + PX. See table 5.6 for definitions of variable symbols. 
that  differ  only  in  the  assumption  that the firm’s choice  variable  is 
unfunded  pension  liabilities rather than total pension  liabilities. Here 
Sharpe’s analysis implies that aspects of the firm’s operating environment 
that affect  its probability  of  bankruptcy-variability  of  earnings,  for 
example-should  also increase the firm’s incentive to underfund its pen- 
sion. Once again, the strong positive relationship between (unfunded) 
pension liabilities and the firm’s other liabilities holds up regardless of  the 
controlling variable. The results for the effects of the individual control- 
ling  variables  are again  about as in  table  5.6. In particular,  neither 
volatility of earnings nor volatility of rate of return exhibits the significant 
positive effect that would be consistent with Sharpe’s hypothesis. 
Finally, the form of  both (7) and (8) assumes not only that the firm 
takes its pension liabilities as given in deciding on pension funding but 
also that the firm takes decisions solely on the difference  (PL -  PA) 
irrespective of  either individual amount. In other words, (7) and (8) are 
equivalent, respectively, to 
(9) 
PL  BL  PA 
NW  NW  NW 
-a+6-+y-  -- 
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PL  BL  --  PA -a+6-+y-+pX 
NW  NW  NW 
subject  to the constraint  6 = 1. The data consistently  reject  this con- 
straint, however. Estimating (9) for the full sample yields 6 = .60 and y = 
-  .06, with  respective t-statistics 42.8 and  -4.9  (R2  = .59).” For the 
subsample with  PLITA  2.03, the corresponding results are 6 = .63 and 
y = -  .09, with respective t-statistics 32.8 and  -4.4 (R2  = .66). For the 
subsample with PLITA 2 .lo,  the results are 6 = .66 and y = -  .16, with 
respective t-statistics 22.6 and -  4.7 (EL  = .64). The results of estimating 
(10) with any of the control variables shown in tables 5.6  and 5.7 indicate 
similar values for 6 and y, and p values that are again consistent with 
those found in estimating (5)  and (8). 
Hence the firm-to-firm variation in pension funding does not simply 
reflect individual firms’ decisions strictly about their unfunded liabilities. 
At the margin, with other factors equal, a firm with an additional $1 of 
pension liabilities typically funds only about 60$ more in pension assets. 
This marginal funding rate-marginal  from one firm to the next, that is, 
rather than for one firm over time-is  also just  equal to the average 
funding ratio (.62) for all firms in the sample. In addition, the consistent 
finding of  a negative  y value in  (9) and (10) indicates that firms with 
greater amounts of nonpension liabilities fund their pension liabilities less 
fully, to the extent of about a lo$ reduction in pension funding for each $1 
of  additional nonpension liabilities. This result is again consistent with 
Sharpe’s analysis of the pension funding decision in the context of the 
value of the put to the PBGC. 
The main conclusions that emerge from this consideration of the firm’s 
choice of pension liabilities and funding, on the assumption that the asset 
and liability totals on the firm’s balance sheet are predetermined with 
respect to its pension decisions, are (1) that pension liabilities, either in 
total or in  excess of  funding,  depend positively  on the firm’s other 
liabilities; (2) that firms do  not make decisions simply with respect to their 
unfunded pension liabilities, but instead fund pension liabilities less than 
one-for-one  at the margin; (3) that funding of the firm’s pension liabilities 
depends negatively on its other liabilities; and (4) that, apart from labor- 
specific characteristics like the firm’s labor intensiveness and the working- 
retired status of its labor force, basic aspects of the firm’s risk and return 
position have no apparent effect on its choice of either total or  unfunded 
pension liabilities. 
5.3  The Earnings-Smoothing Hypothesis 
The discussion of  pension funding strategy in Section 5.2 focuses on 
fundamental aspects of portfolio behavior: substitutability versus com- 
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assets offset pension liabilities, and the role of other measures of risk and 
return confronting the firm. From the perspective of any familiar theory 
of corporate financial behavior, these considerations and others like them 
are the principal determinants of the firm’s pension decisions. 
By contrast, discussions of  pension funding strategy by corporate prac- 
titioners often emphasize different factors. In particular, in seeking to 
explain why so many firms underfund their pension plans despite appar- 
ent tax incentives to fund fully, corporate financial officers and other 
financial market participants frequently cite the “hidden” nature of pen- 
sion liabilities. Because the pension plan is off the balance sheet, share- 
holders  and others may  be  at  least  partly  unaware  of  the associated 
liabilities. The most obvious implication of this assertion is that a firm 
may be able to raise its share price by substituting pension liabilities for 
liabilities that appear on the balance sheet, but recent research on the 
relationship between stock prices and pension  liabilities has provided 
evidence that typically warrants rejecting this proposition.’” 
A further implication of the idea that pension assets and liabilities are 
hidden is that shareholders and other interested persons may judge the 
firm’s performance by its reported earnings rather than by more compre- 
hensive flow measures. Because contributions to a firm’s pension plan 
reduce its reported earnings in the same way as any other expense item, 
control  over the timing of  pension  contributions enables firms to in- 
fluence the time path of reported earnings. To the extent that the man- 
agement seeks to report smoothly growing earnings over time, therefore, 
it may want to increase pension contributions when business is strong and 
reduce them when business is weak. Such actions need not change the 
total amount contributed to the pension plan over time. Indeed, in the 
broader context that consolidates the firm’s pension assets and liabilities 
with its other assets and liabilities, such actions change nothing at all. 
They have a purpose only if some constituency, whose actions matter to 
the corporation, focuses on the time path of  reported earnings. 
This earnings-smoothing hypothesis provides a potential explanation 
for the pension underfunding puzzle to the extent that firms with  un- 
funded pension liabilities have more flexibility to adjust the timing of 
their pension contributions than do firms with  fully funded pensions. 
Restrictions on prefunding unaccrued pension liabilities prevent a firm 
with  a fully  funded  pension  from  making  extraordinary  increases  in 
contributions, and firms that simply decide to fund fully choose thereby 
to forgo using the potential flexibility in the opposite direction. 
Data from the 1977 Form 5500 sample provide evidence indicating that 
firms typically do manage earnings in this way. For the entire sample of 
firms with defined-benefit plans, 70.0% had before-tax reported earnings 
streams that were smoother, as measured  by  the normalized  10-year 
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earnings including pension contributions. On an after-tax basis, with the 
included pension contributions adjusted for additional taxes that the firm 
would otherwise have paid, 70.5% of  firms had smoother reported earn- 
ings than consolidated earnings. 
Nevertheless, the data provide almost no support for the claim that 
firms with underfunded pension liabilities are more likely to manage their 
reported earnings in this way. Table 5.8 shows the percentages of firms 
with smoother reported than consolidated earnings, comparable to the 
percentages reported above, for a breakdown of the full sample accord- 
ing to the ratio of pension assets to pension liabilities. If  anything, these 
distributions seem to indicate that firms with underfunded pension liabili- 
ties are less likely to engage in smoothing their reported earnings by 
managing their pension contributions. Only for the two extreme subsam- 
ples-with  funding ratios below .10 or above .9&does  the relationship 
go in the hypothesized direction. 
A more systematic examination of the data confirms this impression. 
Estimating the regression 
PA  o(E)  =a+p--, 
o(E  + PC)  PL 
where cr(E) and o(E  + PC) are the normalized  10-year standard devia- 
tions of  reported earnings and consolidated earnings, respectively, yields 
a value of  p which is positive, as hypothesized, but negligibly small and 
with t-statistic less than 0.1. The results for the relationship based on 
after-tax earnings are analogous. 
In sum, the evidence does show substantial prevalence of  the timing of 
pension contributions so as to smooth reported earnings, but it does not 
support the hypothesis that this practice is related to the funding status of 
Table 5.8  Relationship between Earnings Smoothing and Pension Funding 
Percentage Showing Smoother Reported 
than Consolidated Earnings 
Funding Ratio  Before Tax  After Tax 
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firms’ pensions. The explanation for the underfunding puzzle apparently 
lies elsewhere. 
5.4  Pension Asset Allocations 
Private pension plans invest their  assets in  a way  unlike  any other 
major category of institutional investors. For the aggregate of  all pension 
plans, nearly two-thirds of all assets held are corporate equities. Among 
other major investor groups (apart from mutual funds), the correspond- 
ing fractions are about one-fifth equities for the public pension  plans 
sponsored by state and local governments, one-sixth equities for fire and 
casualty insurance companies, and one-ninth equities for life insurance 
companies (even including some “separate accounts”).lY  Clearly there is 
something unique about the investment choices made by private pension 
plans. 
To the extent that the assets in a corporation’s defined-benefit pension 
plan “belong”  to the sponsoring firm’s shareholders, in the sense that 
they and not the plan’s beneficiaries stand to gain or  lose according to the 
assets’  return,  the  heavy  concentration  of  private  pension  assets  in 
equities is not surprising.2”  By holding the corporation’s shares in the first 
place,  shareholders have  already  expressed the  desire  for  an equity 
investment.  Because  of  the pension  plan(s)  that  the  firm  sponsors, 
however,  each such investment represents ownership in two pools of 
assets. If the firm’s pension plan holds debt securities instead of equities, 
then the shareholder’s investment is no longer a pure (or even levered) 
equity but a mixture of debt and equity claims. 
In the simplest abstraction like that used to motivate the discussion in 
section 5.2, a corporation would not hold its pension assets in any form 
other than the ordinary assets of  its business-that  is, in its own stock. 
Legal restrictions preclude holding pension assets entirely in this form, 
however, and also impose “prudence” standards that many firms inter- 
pret to preclude investing pension assets entirely in equity securities even 
on a fully diversified basis. Once again, therefore, the extreme simplifica- 
tion does not adequately  describe the behavior of actual corporations  and 
the pension  plans  that they  sponsor. In addition, tax  considerations 
appear to favor holding equity assets outside the pension plan and debt 
assets in the plan.” 
The discussion in section 5.2 emphasizes the role of the firm’s pension 
assets and liabilities, along with the assets and liabilities on its balance 
sheet,  in determining its overall risk and return posture. The allocation of 
the pension  assets among alternative investment vehicles  is a further 
element in this calculus. For example, borrowing in the credit market to 
finance additional (tax-deduction augmented) pension contributions has 
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these funds in debt securities, but such an action increases the firm’s risk if 
the pension plan invests in equities.22 
The dependence of the firm’s risk and return posture on the allocation 
of its pension assets raises in turn the possibility that these allocations 
may depend on the firm’s asset-liability structure  in the sense of either (1) 
or (2)  above, or on  other characteristics  of  the firm’s business  and 
financial situation  as introduced  in  (3),  or on both.  Sharpe’s analysis 
described in section 5.2, for example, suggests that firms with nontrivial 
probability of bankruptcy have an incentive to  maximize the value of the 
effective put to the PBGC. In the context of  pension  asset allocation 
decisions, therefore, the Sharpe hypothesis is that firms bearing greater 
overall risk  will  tend to invest their pension  assets more in  equities. 
Hence the more highly levered a firm is (as measured by debt on the 
balance sheet or by unfunded pension liabilities), or the greater is its risk 
exposure in other regards, the greater is the firm’s incentive to invest its 
pension assets in equities. 
In the simple context of  (3), the question of  pension asset allocation 
represents simply a disaggregation within the pension asset total PA. By 
contrast, if  the total  amount of  pension assets is predetermined with 
respect  to the allocation-as  seems plausible  in  the context  of  most 
corporations’ decision procedures-then  PA is the constraining variable 
and the portfolio choice problem is of  the form 
where the PA, are specific forms of  pension assets and a  and B are again 
as in (3). Table 5.9 presents the results of estimating this relationship, for 
the sample of  all Compustat firms sponsoring defined benefit plans, in the 
somewhat different form 
where PAE, PAD, and PA0  are pension assets in defined-benefit plans, 
held in equities, debt securities, and other investment vehicles, repec- 
tively, a  is a vector of coefficients summing to zero, and y is a vector of 
coefficients summing to unity. 
The one result that stands out in table 5.9 is the negative relationship 
between the allocation of  pension assets to equities and the variability of 128  Benjamin M. Friedman 
Table 5.9  Determinants of Pension Portfolio Allocation 
PAEIBA  PADIBA  PAOIBA 
Control 
Variable  Y  P  Y  P  Y  P 
PiEBIT)  .31 
(58.1) 
u(EBIT)  .31 
CL(T1E)  .30 
(58.3) 
(55.1) 
AGE  .31 
(58.1) 
PAIPL  .30 
(39.3) 
-  .I8 
(-0.6) 
-  29 
( -  2.3) 
(0.3) 
.oo 
-  .o1 
(- 0.5) 


























-  .oO 
(- 0.4) 
-  .OO 
(-0.1) 
-  .oo 
( -  0.3) 
Note:  Results  shown  are  estimated  coefficients  (and  f-statistics)  for  the  regression 
PA,/BA  =  (Y + y(PA/BA)  + PX. See table 5.6 for definitions of  variable symbols. 
the firm’s earnings relative to trend-a  result that is directly counter to 
the implication of Sharpe’s hypothesis,  Moreover, this result holds re- 
gardless of the definition of earnings used (before tax, after tax, with or 
without consolidation of pension contributions, etc.), and it also holds for 
subsamples limited according to the importance of pension assets in the 
firm’s overall asset structure.23  Hence firms with greater business risk, as 
measured by greater volatility of  earnings, systematically seek to offset at 
least part of that risk by investing their pension assets in instruments other 
than equities. 
It is interesting that several  measures included  in  table 5.9 do not 
appear to affect pension  asset  allocations.  Despite  the incentives for 
taxable firms to hold high-yield assets in their pension plans and low-yield 
assets on their balance sheets, as emphasized by Black (1980) and Tepper 
(1981), the firm’s tax status over the past 5 years has no apparent impact 
at this level.  Similarly, although the age and related  structure of  the 
pension plan’s beneficiary population affects the time profile of liabilities 
under the plan, the current employment ratio also has no effect. Finally, 
the firm’s overall pension funding ratio has no noticeable effect either- 
again in apparent contradiction of  Sharpe’s analysis. 
It is also useful to note how two specific aspects of the results shown in 
table 5.9 carry over to the larger sample including Compustat  firms’ 
defined-contribution plans as well as their defined-benefit plans. First, 
the negative  relationship  between  earnings volatility  and  the  equity 
allocation is smaller in  absolute magnitude,  but statistically more sig- 
nificant, in the broader sample.24  With (T (EBZT)  as the control variable in 
(13), the estimated  value of  p in  the equity equation is  -.11,  with 129  Pension Funding, Asset Allocation, and Corporate Finance 
t-statistic -  4.0 (R2  = .60). Second, although the current employment 
ratio of the beneficiary population does not matter in the defined-bene- 
fit-only sample, it does in the broader sample. With AGE as the control 
variable, the estimated value of  p in the equity equation is ,014, with 
t-statistic 2.1  (R2  = .60).’5 Because a large AGE ratio typically reflects a 
younger beneficiary population, a positive p value means that plans with 
younger workers are typically more heavily invested in equities. Hence 
pension plans in which the beneficiaries stand to gain or lose according to 
the return on the plan’s invested assets do take account of the beneficiary 
population’s age  structure in  making  asset  allocation  decisions,  even 
though plans in which the firm’s shareholders stand to gain or lose from 
the assets’ return do not.2b 
The pension asset allocation  and the pension funding ratio are two 
major determinants of prospective risk and return for many firms. A third 
important element in the risk and return structure, of course, is the debt 
on  the firm’s balance sheet.  The relationship among these several compo- 
nents raises the possibility,  therefore, that the firm’s allocation  of  its 
pension assets may  also depend on its basic  leverage. A relationship 
consistent with the risk-offsetting strategy reported above, for example, 
would be for highly levered firms to offset some of  their leverage by 
holding debt securities in their defined-benefit pension plans.*’ Alterna- 
tively,  under either Sharpe’s PBGC put  hypothesis or some form  of 
“general aggressiveness” hypothesis, firms content to have a more lever- 
aged position, as indicated by the liabilities on their balance sheets, might 
further extend that risk  posture by  investing  their  pension  assets in 
equities. 
Table 5.10 presents the results of an attempt to examine this question 
in compact form by estimating the regression 
+ PX, 
PAD  -  BL  - 
PAD + PAE  +’  BL + BEQ 
where BE& is the book value of equity on the firm’s balance sheet, and all 
other variables are as before. The estimated value of y is consistently 
positive, in contradiction to either the Sharpe hypothesis or a “general 
aggressiveness”  hypothesis,  indicating  instead  that  firms  with  more 
highly levered balance sheets have some tendency to offset that leverage 
by investing more of  their pension assets in debt securities.” Somewhat 
surprisingly, however, this positive relationship is statistically significant 
(and larger) in the broader sample including defined-contribution  plans 
but not in the sample limited to defined-benefit plans. 
The estimated p values shown in table 5.10 support and extend the 
findings shown in table 5.9  in several ways. First, the allocation of pension 
assets to  debt securities is positively  related  to any  measure  of  the 
variability  of  earnings.  It is  interesting that this effect, too, is always 130  Benjamin M. Friedman 
Table 5.10  Relationship between Pension Asset Allocation 
and Firm Leverage 
Defined Benefit  Only  All  Pension  Plans 
Control 
Variable  Y  P  Y  P 
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Note:  Results  shown  are  estimated  coefficients  (and  t-statistics)  for  the  regression 
PADI(PAD  + PAE)  = a + y[BL/(BL  + BEQ)]  + PX,  where EiEQ = ratio of  earnings  to 
book value of equity; p(E/EQ)  = 10-year mean of  E/EQ;  and u(E/EQ)  = 10-year  standard 
deviation of E/EQ  around p(E/EQ).  See table 5.6  for definitions of  other variable symbols. 
larger and more highly significant in the broader sample. Second, firms 
with high rates of  return (to either assets or book equity) tend to invest 
their pension assets more in equities and less in debt securities. Third, the 
firm's tax status apparently has no independent impact on pension asset 
allocation, although allowing for it about doubles the estimated magni- 
tude of  the effect of  balance sheet leverage. Fourth, after allowance for 
balance sheet leverage, firms with younger pension beneficiary popula- 
tions tend to invest more in debt securities and less in equities, although 
the estimated effect is smaller (as would be expected) and statistically 
insignificant in the broader sample including defined-contribution plans. 
The main  conclusions  of  this  analysis  of  the allocation  of  pension 
assets, on the assumption that not only the pension asset total but also the 
other principal  elements of  the firm's  asset and liability  structure are 
predetermined with respect to that allocation choice, are (1) that firms 
with  more volatile  earnings invest pension  assets so as to offset their 
ordinary business risk by holding less equity and more debt securities in 
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invest pension assets so as to offset this risk too, again by  holding less 
equity and more debt securities in the pension; (3) that firms earning high 
rates of return adopt the opposite allocation strategy, investing pension 
assets more in equities and less in  debt securities; and (4) that firms’ 
pension asset allocation decisions also depend on the current employ- 
ment status of the pension beneficiary population, with employed (hence 
presumably  younger)  beneficiaries  leading firms  with  defined-benefit 
plans to invest pension assets less in equity and more in debt  securities but 
with just the opposite effect for defined-contribution plans. 
5.5  The Corporate Balance Sheet 
The empirical analysis undertaken in sections 5.2  and 5.4 considers first 
the firm’s pension funding strategy, and then its pension asset allocation, 
on the assumption that the amount and nature of assets and liabilities on 
the firm’s balance  sheet are predetermined with  respect to decisions 
about the firm’s pension. Such a secondary role for pension decisions in 
corporate financial structures may be plausible when the sums involved 
are small in relation to the sponsoring firm’s ordinary business assets and 
liabilities. In an increasing number of corporations, however, pension 
liabilities (and pension assets too, if  the liabilities are fully funded) are 
large in comparison to the assets and liabilities that appear on the firm’s 
balance sheet. Moreover, pensions are continuing to grow more rapidly 
than general corporate assets or liabilities. The larger pensions become, 
the more likely it is that firms make decisions about their pension assets 
and liabilities and their other assets and liabilities jointly. 
As the discussion in section 5.2 already emphasizes, the combination of 
legal  requirements and established labor market practices sharply re- 
stricts many firms’ flexibility with respect to their pension liabilities. In 
considering possible interrelationships by which the firm’s pension assets 
and liabilities affect its ordinary business decisions, therefore, a useful 
place to begin is the possibility that the direction of influence in (4)  and 
(5)  above is backward. Estimating the reverse relationship, in which the 
firm takes its pension liabilities as given in deciding how much to borrow 
on its balance sheet, 
PL 
-=a+y-  BL 
NW  NW 
yields y = .26, with t-statistic 7.8(R2  = .04), for the sample of all Com- 
pustat firms sponsoring defined-benefit plans, and y = .34,  with t-statistic 
7.9 (R2  = .17), for the subsample in which each firm’s pension liabilitiss 
equal at least one-tenth of  its total assets.” 
That estimating (4)  in the reverse order (15) again leads to a significant 
positive relationship is hardly surprising. What is more interesting is that 132  Benjamin M. Friedman 
the positive  partial  relationship between pension liabilities and other 
liabilities-that  is, the relationship after allowance for other controlling 
variables-also  holds up on reversal of the ordering. Table 5.11 presents 
results, analogous to those in table 5.6, of  estimating the reverse of  (5), 
PL 
-  a + y-  + PX,  BL 
hw  NW 
-- 
for the full sample and the sample with PLITA 2 .lo. Once again, the 
strong positive value of y appears regardless of  the choice of controlling 
variable. 
Although  the  focus  of  this  chapter  is  not  on  corporations’  debt 
issuance, except in its relation  to their sponsored pension  plans,  it is 
interesting nevertheless to notice several of  the p values in table 5.11. 
First, the growth of earnings had no effect on pension liabilities in (5),  but 
earnings growth negatively affects other liabilities in (16). This result also 
holds for other definitions of earnings. Second, the mean rate of  return 
either on assets or on equity (not shown in the table) had no effect on 
pension liabilities in (5),  but mean returns negatively affect other liabili- 
Table 5.11  Relationship between Balance Sheet Liabilities 
and Pension Liabilities 
Full Sample  PLiTA 2 .10 Subsample 
Control 











.  00 
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-  .33 
( -  2.4) 
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(1.2) 
-  8.45 
( -  4.0) 
(- 1.0) 
-  11.1) 






-  .02 
( -  0.5) 
-  .63 
( -  2.5) 
-  .28 
(- 1.5) 
Note: Results  shown  are  estimated  coefficients  (and  t-statistics)  for  the  regression 
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ties in (16). Third, the variability of  the firm's rate of  return  affected 
pension liabilities negatively in  (5),  but return variability affects other 
liabilities positively in (16), at least in the full sample.3"  Fourth, labor 
intensity affected pension liabilities positively in (5), at least in the full 
sample, but labor intensity affects other liabilities negatively in  (16). 
Each of these influences is familiar in the literature on corporate choice of 
capital structures, and these results would perhaps be of  interest in an 
investigation  of  that subject. In the context of  this chapter's  focus on 
pensions, the main point is simply that the positive partial relationship 
between pension liabilities and other liabilities holds up after allowance 
for any of these separate effects. 
Similar conclusions follow from reversing the order of  (7) and (8), 
which treat not total pension liabilities but only the unfunded portion as 
the relevant measure. Estimating the reverse relationship 
PL -  PA 
-a+y  BL 
NW  NW 
-- 
yields  y = SO, with  t-statistic  10.1@-2 = .07), for the full sample and 
y = .61,  with f-statistic 10.8  (IT2 = .27), for the PLITA  2.10  sub~ample.~' 
Controlling for additional influences by estimating the regression 
+ PX 
PL -  PA 
-a+y  BL 
NW  NW 
-- 
also yields consistently positive y values, and p values roughly in line with 
those shown in table 5.11 and discussed above. 
Once again, it is useful to examine whether pension liabilities and 
assets matter separately in this context, or whether what matters is only 
the difference, as in (17) arid (18). Estimating the regression 
PL  PA  BL 
NW  NW  NW 
-a+y---+6--  -- 
for the full sample yields y = .49 and S = -.51,  with respective t-statistics 
4.8  and -2.7 (R2  = .05). Forthe PLITA 2  .losample, the corresponding 
results are y = .58 and 6 = -  .54, with respective t-statistics 6.1 and -  3.1 
(R2  = .17). To the extent that firms make borrowing decisions in light of 
their pension  assets and liabilities, therefore, what matters is just the 
unfunded pension liabilitie~.~'  Moreover, these results too hold up in the 
presence of other controlling variables like those included in table 5.10. 
Finally, if  firms decide on their pension assets and liabilities and on 
their other assets and liabilities in  a fully joint way, then  neither the 
direction of  influence assumed in the regressions presented in section 5.2 
nor that assumed in (15)-(19)  is strictly correct. Instead, a fully simul- 
taneous portfolio choice like that in (3)-or,  if only unfunded pension 
liabilities matter, (6)-would  be the correct way to view the firm's deci- 134  Benjamin M. Friedman 
sion process. Table 5.12 presents results (values of  p) for estimating (3) 
directly, using one independent variable at a time. These results add little 
to the analysis above, however. With the somewhat marginal exception 
of  the earnings volatility measure, the estimation of  the full portfolio 
choice model does not reveal influences that affect both the pension and 
the balance sheet.” 
The main conclusions of  this analysis of  the relationship between the 
firm’s borrowing decisions and its pension assets and liabilities are (1) 
that the amount of  liabilities on the firm’s balance  sheet is  positively 
related to the firm’s pension liabilities and (2) that what matters for the 
determination of balance sheet liabilities in this context is just the firm’s 
unfunded pension liabilities rather than its pension assets and liabilities 
separately. 
5.6  Concluding Remarks 
The final paragraph in each of sections 5.2-5.5  summarizes in capsule 
form the principal specific empirical findings of this chapter, and there is 
no need to restate each one here. The unifying overall conclusion from 
the data is that United States corporations do not manage the pension 
plans which they sponsor as if  these plans had nothing to do with the 
corporation. Different responses appear to characterize firms’ behavior 
in different contexts, but the evidence persistently indicates clear rela- 
tionships between decisions about pension assets and liabilities and deci- 
sions about the other assets and liabilities of the firm. At the same time, 
the pattern of these relationships is, more often than not, inconsistent 
with familiar hypotheses that have emerged thus far in the theoretical 
literature analyzing pension aspects of  corporate finance. 
At least three caveats are important, however. The most significant is 
that the measurement of pension liabilities is hardly uniform across firms. 
To  the extent that each corporation’s management believes that the value 
it reports for liabilities on Form 5500 Schedule B is the best available 
measure of  the firm’s actual commitment or exposure, firm-to-firm varia- 
tion in actuarial assumptions need not affect the analysis here. If manage- 
ments make allowance for the differing actuarial assumptions, however, 
then  this  analysis neglects  a potentially  important element.” Further 
potential problems of  a related nature also arise in connection with the 
date and the method chosen for Schedule B valuation of pension assets. 
The second major caveat stems from the use in this chapter of  fully 
consolidated  firm  data, incorporating  all  wholly  owned  subsidiaries, 
whenever  possible.  No  doubt  many  parent corporations  do adopt a 
consolidated approach to financial management. Even so, the possibility 
remains that many firms handle such matters as pension decisions in a 
decentralized way, or that some of  the parent-subsidiary relationships 135  Pension Funding, Asset Allocation, and Corporate Finance 
Table 5.12  Full Portfolio Treatment of the 
Pension and Balance Sheet 
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-  .01 
( -  0.4) 
.22 
(1.0) 
-  .28 
(- 1.6) 






-  .62 
(-1.5) 
-  .46 
( -  0.6) 




-  .68 
(-5.2) 
-  .21 





-  .14 
(-0.6) 
-  .41 
(- 1.0) 
( -  0.2) 
(5.1) 
-  .oO 
.45 
-  .28 
(-3.8) 
Note:  Results shown are estimated coefficients (and t-statistics) for the regression  & [BA]=...  BL 
See table 5.6 for definitions of  variable symbols. 
consolidated here were then (and may still be) too recent to have had 
much  impact on the structure of  the subsidiaries’ pension  assets and 
liabilities. 
The third reason for caution in interpreting the results presented here 
is simply that they reflect evidence from a cross section of  firms (a quite 
comprehensive cross section, to be sure) in one year only. Despite its 
portfolio-theoretic approach, therefore, the analysis entirely omits any 
account of  effects due to changing yield relationships over time. For the 
same reason, the analysis is  also subject to all of  the usual problems 
associated with observing only one point in time. Was 1977 a “typical” 
year in any or all of the many senses that matter here? It is never possible 
to answer such a question adequately. At the least, however, the Em- 
ployee Retirement Income Security Act and the Pension Benefit Guar- 
anty Corporation were both very recent as of 1977, and neither may yet 
have had its full impact on corporations’ behavior. 
Each of  these three reservations about the analysis presented in this 136  Benjamin M. Friedman 
chapter points  to potentially  fruitful  directions  for  further empirical 
research.  Taking account of  cross-firm variation  in  pension  actuarial 
decisions, more carefully treating the range of possible parent-subsidiary 
relationships, and working with additional data as they become available 
would all be major extensions of this work which could importantly alter 
the conclusions reached. No doubt additional lines of investigation would 
provide new insights also. This chapter only begins to analyze the inter- 
relationships connecting private pensions and corporate finance. As pri- 
vate pensions continue to grow, in both absolute and relative terms, those 
interrelationships will  almost surely become more powerful and more 
important for understanding financial behavior. 137  Pension Funding, Asset Allocation, and Corporate Finance 
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Appendix 
(with 100 or  more participants) 
This form is requid  to  be filed  under sections 104 and 4065  of  the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974  and sections 6057(b) 
and 6058(a)  of  the  Internal  Revenue  Code.  referred  to  as  the  Code. 
This  Form  is 
'pen 
lnSPeCtiOn 
5  (a)  (I)  Name of plan 
(I,)  0  Check If changed s8nce last return/repart 
t  If any item does not apply. enter"N/A." 
1 (a)  Name of plan sponsor (employer If for a  single employer plan) 
Address (number and street) 
5  (b) Effective date of plan 
5  (c)  Enter three digit 
plan number t  I  j  I 
City or town. State and ZIP code 
2  (a)  Name of pian  administrator (if  Other than plan sponsor) 
Address (number and street) 
City or town. State and ZIP code 
1 (b) Employer IdentlflCatlOn  number 
1 (c) Telephone number Of  IPo"5or 
0 
1 (d)  Employer taxable year ends 
1 (e)  Business code number 
Month  Day  Year  19 
2 (b) Administrator's omplqsr identifiation no. 
2  (c) Telephone  number  of  administrator 
3  ~ame.  address and ideotihcatton number of 0  plan sponsor and/or 0  plan administrator as they appeared on the isst return/ 
report flied for this plan if not the Sam= a=  1  or 2 above t  .................................................................... 138  Benjamin M. Friedman 
(9) During the plan year. was any partsipant(s1 separated from Service with a deferred vested benefit? .... 
If  'Yes." 588  I"Str"Ctm"5  ~~  ~- .~ 
8  Plan amendment information  (welfare plans complete only ?a). (b)(i) and (0). 
(a)  Was any amendment to ths  plan adopted 4"  this plan year!. 
(b) II "YeS."  (I)  And If a  msterlal madif~cation.  has a  Surnmmy dercriptton 01 this modrftcation- 
(A)  Been  sent  to plan  participants!  .................. 
................ 
. 
(8) Been filed with DOL?  ....................... 
(11)  Doer  any  such  amendment result  en  the  reduction  01  the  accrued benefit of  any  participant  under  the plan!  .  . 
(,if)  Will amendment result I" a reductton of current or future benef#tr?  .......... 
(iv)  Has a determlnatkon letter been requested from IRS  wlth respect to such  amendment?.  ... 
Year  (c)  Enter the date the  most  recent amendment was adopted .  . b Month 
9  ~ian  termlnatlon mIorrnat8on (welfare plans complete only (a), (b).  (c) and (1)): 
(a)  War this plan terminated duilng thls plan year or any prior plan year? 
(c)  Was a reSOlUtioO to terminate this plan adopted during this plan year or any prlor plan year? 
(d)  II  (a1  01 (c) IS  ''Yes,''  have you recelved a Iawrable determinitian  letter lrom IRS wth respect to such  le#mlnallon! 
(e)  If (d)  15 "No,"  has  a deterrnlnstlon  letter been  requested from IRS! 
Day 
......  ....... 




....  (1)  It (a)  01  (c)  id  "Yes."  -~  -  have  ~  partiripants and beneficiaries been notilied 01 the teirninillDn or the proposed tPIminltiOn~ 
10  (a)  In this plan year,  was this  plan merged or mnsolidafed into another  plan or were assets or iiablllticr  transferred  to another plan?.  . 
~0.m  55aa (1'177)  P.8.  2 
(5) Mher plan features  (i)  0  Thnfi-savings  (ri)  0  Keogh (HA. 10) Plan 
(iii)  n  Employee stock  Ownership  as part Of  a qualified plan (check  only if you checked a box in (b)(iO  above) 




-  - 
-  mi! 
--  __  __ 
-- 
~ 
(e)  0  Other (spec8fy) b  .............. 
(f)  If (b)  or  (c)  IS checked. enter the number of Schedule A'S (Form 5500) whlCh are attached  .....  b 
12  Did  any  pemon  who  rendered  ~ewices  to  the  plan  IOCIIYI.  directly  Or  #nd#recIly.  cornpenrat8on  lrom the  plan In the plan  year? .  , 0  Yes  0  NO 
I  I  I  I  I- 
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13 Plan  assets  and liabilities at the beginning and the end of the  plan year (Ilst all assets and liabilities at current value)  It plan IS 
[A 




Note:  Include all plan assets  and liabilities of il  trust or separately maintained fund. (If  more than one  trustlfund. report on a 
combined basis.)  Include  unallocated. but not allocated.  insurance Contracts.  Round Off amounts  to nearest  dollar. 
I  b. 
.3'  y=='  AS18ets 
(vii,)  Loans  other than  mortgages ................ 
(IX)  Value  of  interest  ~n pooled fund(r)  .............. 
(x)  Other  Investments ................... 
(xi)  Total general mvestments, sum of  (I) through  (x)  ......... 
[r)  Corporate debt instruments  ................ 
Corporate stocks:  (A)  Preferred ............... 
(6) Common.  .............. 
(w)  Real estate  ..................... 
(iv)  Mortgages  ..................... 
(v)  Loans Other than mortgages ................ 
(w)  Other investments  ................... 
("if)  Total party-minterest investments. rum of (i)  through (vi) ....... 
(e)  Bulldings and Other depreciable  property .............. 
(1)  Valueof unallocated insurance contracts: 
(r)  separate  account*  ................... 
(14)  Other.. ..................... 
[w)  Total.  (I)  plus  ($1)  ................... 
(d)  Party-in-interest  investments: 
(it) 
(a)  Cash:  (r)  On  hand ..................... 
In bank:  (A)  Certificates of deposlt .............. 
(C)  Nonlnterert bearing  ................. 
(id)  Total  cash  ..................... 
(ii)  Employee contributions  ................. 
(iii)  Other.  ...................... 
(iv)  Reserve for doubtful accounts  ............... 
(v)  Net receivables,  rum  of (I),  (ii) and (ili) minus (iv) ......... 
(ti) 
(8)  Other  interest bearing  ................ 
(b)  Receivables: (i)  Employer Contributions  .............. 
(c)  General investments  other than party-in-interest  investments: 
U.S.  Government securities: 
WMHHHHHA FHHHH/HA 
WM///HM  WM/HI/A 
(A)  Long term  .......... 
(E)  Short term  .......... 
State and municipal  securities  ..... 
Corporate debt instruments: 
(A)  Long term  .......... 
(6) Short  term .......... 
(8)  Common ..... 
Shares of  a  registered investment company . 
Real estate  ........... 
Mortgages ............ 
COrpDratertockr:  (A)  Preferred ..... 
(8) Other assets ....................... 
(h)  Total  assets.  sum of (a)(!\$). (b)(v).  (C)(XI).  (d)(uN).  (e).  (f)(ill)  and (g)  .... 
Liabilities 
(I)  Payables' (I)  Plan clams ................... 
(irr)  Total  payabler.  (I)  plus (ii) ................ 
(j)  Acquisition indebtedness ................... 
(h)  Other liabllltlee  ...................... 
(I)  Total liabilities. sum of (i)(w).  (1)  and (k)  .............. 
(m) Net assets,  (h)  less (I). 
....................  (1,)  Other  payables 
................... 
(n)  Duringthe plan year what were the: 
(I)  Total cost of  a~quisitions  for common stock?.  ................ 140  Benjamin M. Friedman 
Form  5500  (1977)  PIIC 4 
14 Plan ~ncome.  expenses and changes in net assets for the plan year: 
Note:  Include  all income and ex~en~e~  of a frust(s)  or seoarately maintained fund(s)  Round off amounts to nearest dollar. 
Income 
(I) Contributions received or receivable in cash from- 
(I)  Employer(s)  (Including contributions on behalf of relf.employed  individuals) 
(of)  Others  ...................... 
($I)  Employees  ..................... 
(b) Noncash rontnbutionr  (speciiy  nature and  by whom  made1 b .................................. 
(c)  Total contributions.  rum  of (a) and (b)  .............. 
(d)  Earnings from mvestments- 
(I)  Interest  ...................... 
(81)  Dlwdends  ..................... 
(m) Rents.  ...................... 
....................................................... 
(iv)  Royalties ...................... 
(11  Aggregate  proceeds  .................. 
(4  Net  realized gain (loss) an sale or exchange of assets- 
(8,)  Aggregate costs.  ................... 
(0  Other income  (SpecW b  ............................................................................................... 
Expenses 
(h)  Distribution of benefits and payments  to  provide benefits- 
(i)  Directly to palticipants or their  beneficiaries  .......... 
(I,)  To murance  carrier or similar Organization far provision of benefits 
(11,)  To other organizations or individuals providing welfare benefits ..... 
(i) Interest expense  ...........  ,  ......... 
0) Administrative expenses- 
(I)  Salaries and allo~ances ................. 
(it1  Fees and  commissions  ................. 
(118)  lnwrsnce premiums for Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation ..... 
(tv)  Insurance premiums forfiducialy insurance otherthan bonding ..... 
... 
(v)  Other administrative expenses .....  ,  .........  ____ 
(k)  Other  expenses  (specify)  t .......................................................................................... 
(I)  Total expenses. sum Of  (h) through (k)  ...................  I  . 
(m) Net mmme (expenserl.  (9) minus (I)  ..................... 
(n)  Change in net assets- 
0)  Unrealized appreciation  (depreciation)  of assets  ......... 
(10  Other changer (rpecW b.  ....................................................... 
(0) Net increase (decrease)  in net assets for fhe year.  (m)  plus (n)  ............. 
(p)  Net assets at  beginning of year.  line 13(m). column a ......  ,  ......... 
(9)  Net assets at end of year.  (0)  plus (p) (eouals line 13(m). column b) ........... 
15  H~S  there been any change  since the last report in  the appointment of any trustee, accountant.  insurance carrier. -  - 
enrolled actuary. admmstrator.  investment manager or custodian?  ............... IT 
If  "Yes."  explain and include the name.  po61t10n.  address and telephone number of the individual Who  left  Or Was  removed by 
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Form  5500 11977) 
23  Complete this item only 11you answered  "Yes."to  Item 6(d) 
Did  one or more Of  the reportable events or other events requiring  notice to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora. 
lion  occur  during  this  plan  year? .......................... 
if "Yes."complete  (a) through (h) below. 
(a)  Notification  by  the  Internal Revenue  Sewice that the  plan  has ceased  to  be a  plan  as described  in Section 
4021(a)(2)  of ERISA or a  determanation  by the Secretary of  Labor of nonampliance with Title I  of ERISA.  . 
(b)  A decrease ~n active  participants to the extent Specified ~n the Instructions ............ 
(c)  A determination by the Internal Revenue Sewice that there has been a termination or partial terminati~n  of the 
plan within the meaning  of  Section 411(d)(3)  of  the Code  ................ 
(d)  An  inability  to pay beneftts  when  due.  ..................... 
(e)  A distribution to a Substantial Owner to the extent specified  in  the instr~ction~  .......... 
(I) An  alternative  method of  compliance has been  prescribed for th15  plan  by the Secretary of Labor  under Section  %%? 
110  of  ERISA.  ............................ 
(9) A ces~stion  of  operations at a facility to the extent specified  m the ~nstructions ........ 
(h)  A withdrawal of a  substantial employer ....  ..........  ...  I  I 
If  additional space  is required for  any  item. attach additional  sheets the same  size as this form. 143  Pension Funding, Asset Allocation, and Corporate Finance 
Date(s)  t  .............  ...........................  .... ,  Amount t 
(c)  Accumulated funding deficiency at end of plan year  (amount of contribution certified by the actuary as 
necessary to reduce the funding deficiency to zero). from 7(m) or  8(g) ............ 
(d)  0)  Accrued l8abilities as of (enter date)  t  .. 
(0)  Value of assets as determined for funding standard account 
(w) Unfunded accrued liability  ........................ 
(e)  Value of vested benefits (if calculated)  .....................  , 
.............. 
(0  Current value of the assets accumulated ~n  the plan as of (enter date)  t  ......................................... 
(g)  Number of persons covered (included  m  the most recent actuarial valuation): (i) Active palticipants.  . 
(b) 
(b)  ,amo!z!  D'aid  htanlh(a)  Vear  Amount  paid 
by empioyeer  by employer  Month")  Year  Amount  pasd 
by omploy~r 





.....................................................................................................................................................................  I  I  ........................ 
AmO!:!  paid 
by emplwecr 
.................................................................................................................................................................... 
Slgnatur.  Of  ac,Y*rY  Dale 
...........................................  Prat Frtrpr.na~~d  .ai  .~Lt~~.~...  ........................................................................................ 
EnmlIrn*nI numbw 
........................................................................................................................................................................... 
MdreIl  T.l.pn0".  numb..  (i"Cl"d1np  .r..  sod.) 144  Benjamin M. Friedman 
Instructions 
For spltt funded plans. the costs and contribu- 
tions  reported  on  Schedule  B  rhavld  mzlude 
thole  rrlafini!  to  bofll trust funds and  insurance 
camere 
Specific Instructions 
(References we  to  line #Ifmi  on thp form I 
4(b)  Advanre approval  lrom IRS at the  elec- 
toon  to  defer  the arrlortllrtlan  01  the rhortfall 
gain  (loss)  andlor the  amori~zat~on  Of  the ac- 
t~ridl  gain  (10511 1s  requ8red  for a plan year. sub- 
sequent  fo the first plan year to  which the short- 
fall method applies  Advance approval from IRS 
1s  required lor discontinuance 
51a)  The vaIu8I1~n  ford plan year may be as 
Of any date /n the year.  including the first and 
last  Valuat~onr  must  be  performed  w8thIn  the 
period rpeclfied  by section 103(dI Of ERISA and 
~ecfion  6059(a)  01  the Code. 
5lbl  Not  applicable lo  the 1rst  plan year  to 
which the minimum funding standards apply. 
5(c) lriirrt  amount  from  item  7(m)  Haw- 
ever  If  the alterndti~e  method  8%  elected.  and 
item 8(p,l  I$  smaller  than  item  7(m). enter  fhc 
ail uunf  liom item 8(~)  File Form 5330 with the 
Internal Revenue Service to pay the 5%  excise 
6  Show all employer  and employee cantribu 
the Code and rect8on 302(cI(iO)  of LRISA) aHer 
the end of the Plan year. 
Statement  by  enrolled  aclus~~.--ln lieu  of 
and !he  acluary'r Oplnlan that the asrul>lpf#onr 
used  ~n preparing Schedule  B  are 8n  the  eggre- 
gate reasonably related to the expcr~cnce  01 the 
plan and to reasonable eiDeCfationZ  and repre 
sent  his  or  her  best  erf8mafe  of  anticipated  ex 
perience under the  plan and  Lo  the best of  hi5 
or her hnowledge the report is complete and aC. 
curate  In  addition.  the aCiildry  may  offer  any 
other Comments  related to the lnlormat8On Con- 
tained ~n Schedule  B 
7 Under the rhonfall melhd  of funding. the 
Normal Cost 8n  the funding standard acCO~"1.  JL 
the chars? per unit 01  production  (or Per  unit of 
5erv1ce) mult#Dl#ed  by the actual  number 01 UnltS 
of prod~c180n  (or  units of I~TYILP)  whmch occurred 
dur8ng  the plan year.  Each  8lllO~lldtlon  #nit*ll- 
menl ~n tne funding standard account IP  I#m#larly 
cdl~ulafed For a plan maintained  by more than 
one  employer. the amort8zation  of  the shortfall 
gain (loss1 and the attuarial em  (loss)  may be 
deferred.  See  regulations under  IeCtlOn  412 Of 
the Code 
7(b)  If no valuation  was  made for  the  CUT. 
rent year. enter the normal cost calculated 8n  Ihe 
most recent actuarial val~dlion.  or the estimated 
Cost  for  the Current year  bared On Such vdlU1 
tion  If amounfr  are  net  as  of  thc date 01 the 
most  ~ent  actmr,ai vaiuar8on.  Nnnmte  ~n the 
itateinent of  actuarial arrumpllonr  and  rneth. 
cas  (as required by 5(01 how the  amounts shown 
were determined. 
8(a)  If the entv  age normal cost method was 
not used to determ8ne the entries 8n item 1.  the 
alternattve  minimum  funding standard  account 
may not be used. 
8(c)  The value  of accrued benefits IhoUId ex- 
clude beneftts accrued for the Current  plan year. 
The  market value  01 assets  should  be reduced 
by the amount of any contributcns for fhe cur- 
lent plan year. 145  Pension Funding, Asset Allocation, and Corporate Finance 
Notes 
1. The 1977 “plan year” for purposes of Form 5500 is either the 1977  calendar year or the 
plan’s fiscal year beginning in 1977. The plan sponsor has until 7 months after the plan year 
ends to filc the return. 
2.  A  one-by-one  inspection  of the  384  plans  reporting  over  $100 million  in  assets 
suggested few obvious omissions among large corporate sponsors. 
3.  By  contrast, the  Federal  Reserve  System’s flow-of-funds accounts  reported  total 
assets of private pension funds as $178 billion at year end 1977 and $198 billion at year end 
1978.  The Form 5500 data therefore confirm the widely acknowledged underreporting in the 
flow-of-funds sample. 
4. The largest single plan, sponsored by General Electric, reported assets of $3.8 billion. 
5.  The great majority of companies sponsor five or fewer plans. The largest number of 
plans sponsored by  any one company (excluding subsidiaries) was 63. 
6.  The computer program that searches for Compustat matches was developed by Clint 
Cummins; I am grateful to him for making the program available. 
7.  The key to this part of  the matching process was the Directory of  Corporate Affilia- 
tions 1’978 (Skokie, Ill.: National Register Publishing Co., 1978). It would be difficult to 
overestimate the amount of  painstaking effort devoted to this task by  Arturo Estrella and 
Joyce Manchester. 
8. Of  the 1,836 consolidated plan sponsors, 1,571 sponsored defined-benefit plans. 
9. The pension sponsor with the largest amount of pension assets on a consolidated basis 
was American Telephone and Telegraph, with $18.4 billion in assets held in three plans 
sponsored by the parent company and 26 plans sponsored by subsidiaries. 
10. See, for example, the work of Sharpe (1976), Oldfield (1977), Black (1980), Feld- 
stein and Seligman (1981), Schoies (1981), and Tepper (1981). 
11. In many situations, a corporation’s principal means of flexibility in this regard is its 
ability to choose what assumptions (interest rate, inflation rate, etc.) to use in calculating the 
actuarial value of the liabilities to be funded. See, for example, Tepper and Affleck (1974). 
A careful empirical study of  corporations’ behavior in this regard represents a potentially 
fruitful line of  research,  but one that lies beyond  the scope of this chapter; see sec. 5.6 
below. 
12.  United  States corporations  must report, as a footnote  to the balance  sheet, the 
difference between vested pension liabilities and the level of pension funding. Neither total 
need be stated individually, nor need the corporation report its nonvested liab 
(except on Form 5500 Schedule B). 
13. Whatever off-balance-sheet assets and liabilities the firm has, apart from PA and 
PL,  are included in BA and BL for purposes of this chapter. See also note 34 below on the 
definition of PL. 
14. The sample for this regression, and those reported in the following discussion, omits 
13 firms for which net worth is sufficiently small that either PLINWor FLINWexceeds 3.0. 
The result of a significant positive relationship also appears (although with smaller y values) 
when VL,  the firm’s vested pension liabilities only, is used in place of total pension liabilities 
PL. (The simple correlation  between  VL  and PL within the total sample is 39.) It is 
interesting to note that regressions of the form (4) and also (5) below, estimated with BA 
instead of  AW as the scale variable, typically show a small negative value of  y which is 
marginally  significant at the  .05 level. By contrast,  most of  the results reported in this 
chapter are essentially invariant to the choice of NW or BA as the scale variable; see note 16 
below for the one other case in which this choice makes a substantive difference. 
15. See also the chapter by  Harrison and Sharpe in this volume. 
16. Defined-benefit plans report total assets explicitly on Form 5500 and implicitly (as 
the difference between liabilities and unfunded liabilities) on Schedule B. The two asset 
measures need not coincide. For the 1977  sample, the simple correlation between the two is 146  Benjamin M. Friedman 
.92 in the disaggregated sample and .95 in the aggregated sample. The results reported here 
and below rely on the asset measure implicit in Schedule B because it is more likely to be 
consistent with the liability measure. Here, as in (4), using vested liabilities VL  in place of 
PL  also consistently results in a significant positive relationship but with smaller y values. In 
the regressions of the form (7) as well as (8) below, replacing NW by BA as the scale variable 
typically leads to small (in absolute value) values of y, of either sign, that are not statistically 
significant; see 14 above. 
17. The t-statistic associated with the explicit test of the null hypothesis S = 1 is 28.2, 
easily warranting  rejection  at any  plausible  confidence  level.  For  the  two  subsample 
regressions  described  immediately  below,  the  analogous t-statistics are  19.2 and  11.9, 
respectively. 
18. See esp. Oldfield (1977) and Feldstein and Seligman (1981), as well as the chapter by 
Feldstein  and Mmck in  this volume. It is always possible, of  course, that managements 
make decisions on the basis of believing that they can affect the share price in this way even if 
that belief is false. 
19. These aggregate data are from the Federal Reserve System’s flow-of-funds accounts 
for  year  end  1980. Although  the  proportions  vary over  time.  primarily  as a result  of 
fluctuations in equity prices, the 1980 values are not atypical. 
20.  See Pesando (1981) for evidence on beneficiaries’ implicit sharing in these returns, 
however. 
21.  See Black (1980) and Tepper (1981). 
22.  This statement abstracts from such factors as risk and maturity differences between 
the debt issued and the debt held. 
23.  For the subsample of firms with PAiBA 2.03, the p value for a(EBZT)  in the equity 
equation is -.37, with t-statistic -2.5;  for the subsample with PAiBA 2.10,  it is p.75, with 
t-statistic  -2.2. 
24.  Again this result carries over to all measures of earnings. 
25. The corresponding p values in the  PAD and PA0 equations are both  negative, 
though not statistically significant. 
26.  This distinction  between  equity investment in the accumulation  and the annuity 
phases of  defined-contribution pension  plans corresponds to what many participants in 
TIAA-CREF voluntarily  elect  when  they switch their  pension  reserves  from CREF to 
TIAA at or near the time of  retirement. 
27.  If  the observations in the samplc corresponded to different dates for the same firm, 
then a positive relationship between balance sheet leverage and pcnsion asset allocations to 
debt securities would be evidence that firms behaved over time as Black (1980) and Tepper 
(1981) have suggested that they should for tax reasons. In a cross-section sample, however, 
no such inference would be warranted. At most, a positive cross-section relationship would 
indicate differences among firms in their extent of implementation of  Black and Tepper’s 
advice. 
28.  This positive relationship is opposite to what I found in  earlier work based on a 
limited sample of Form 5500 and related data for plan year  1976. 
29.  Using vested liabilities VL  in place of  PL in  (15) does not substantially affect the 
estimated y values but does reduce the associated t-statistics; for the two samples reported 
above the results based on VL  are, respectively, y = .31, with t-statistic 6.4(R2 = .03), and 
y = .26, with t-statistic 5.0 (R2  = .07). 
30.  The variability of  the rate of return on equity affects other liabilities negatively in 
both the full sample and the PLiTA 2.10 subsample. 
31.  Using vested  liabilities  VL  in  place  of  PL in  (17) also consistently  results  in  a 
significant positive relationship but with smaller y values. 
32.  These results apply to the Schedule B value of assets. For the Form 5500 asset totals, 
which need not have the same date as the liabilities reported in Schedule B, the correspond- 
ing results are y = .46 and 6 = -.32,  with respective t-statistics 8.9 and -  4.9 (Rz  = .06) for 147  Pension Funding, Asset Allocation, and Corporate Finance 
the  full  sample,  and  y = .58 and  6 = p.40,  with  respective  t-statistics  8.7 and  -4.7 
(Rz  = .23) for the subsample. 
33. The results for estimating (6) are comparable. 
34.  As Jay 0.  Light points out in his discussion in this volume, there is also a problem if 
managements use differing actuarial concepts in defining pension “liabilities”--or,  even if a 
single concept is used, if  that concept differs importantly from that assumed here. The 
concept of pension liabilities used here (as  in all of the previous literature cited above) is the 
actuarial present discounted value of accrued obligations for future benefit payments. This 
concept is identical to the notion of “actuarial present value of accumulated plan benefits” 
as defined by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in its Sturernenr No. 35, 
adopted March 1980 (see esp. pp. 6-9). What matters here, however, is what concepts 
managements used at the time they submitted their companies’ reports for the 1977 plan 
year. On the basis of  a close reading of  the pension handbooks and texts available at that 
time, as well as the few available surveys of pension actuarial practice, it is not possible to 
determine whether-r  to what extent-managements  relied on the concept used here, 
which was later formalized by FASB-35, or the different net concept suggested by Light, or 
yet some other interpretation. The question does bear importantly on the empirical work in 
this chapter, as well as in all other empirical studies involving pension liability data before 
FASB-35. 
Comment  Jay 0.  Light 
First, I would like to congratulate Benjamin M. Friedman for a difficult 
empirical task well  done. I  hesitate  to imagine  just how  many  man- 
months were absorbed in preparing the basic data, but they must have 
been quite a few. The resultant data base has already furnished useful 
insights in Friedman’s chapter, and I trust that it will continue to do so. 
Friedman’s chapter is a first exploratory trip through the data, search- 
ing for important relationships among corporate pension funding policy, 
the allocation of pension fund assets, corporate capital structure, and the 
characteristics of  the underlying firms. It is the most thorough attempt I 
know to find such relationships using the detailed Form 5500 data, and as 
such it is an important work. 
I propose to comment on several of what 1  think are the most interest- 
ing sections of  the chapter. For each section, I will state the empirical 
results that might have been predicted on the basis of  extant pension 
theories and the actual empirical results that were obtained. I will then 
tell some stories that might  help to rationalize some of  the observed 
empirical phenomena. 
Before embarking on these tasks, let me first urge the reader to be 
cautious of Friedman’s results and, perhaps more important, of my own 
comments. The financial decisions being investigated  (funding policy, 
pension investment policy, and capital structure policy) are all, in princi- 
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ple at least, simultaneous decisions. Causality is therefore very unclear, 
and the same cross-sectional results can be rationalized  by  a variety of 
quite different stories. More important, in this area our principal theoret- 
ical insights seem to point toward extremal policies (see, for example, the 
Harrison and Sharpe chapter in this volume). Interpreting  cross-sectional 
regression results in the light of these extremal hypotheses is particularly 
difficult. 
The Asset Allocation Results 
With these words of caution, let me discuss what I find to be Friedman’s 
most interesting results: the relationship of the pension fund’s asset mix 
to other variables. 
As a first step, let us speculate about what empirical relationships we 
would have expected to find on the basis of  extant theory. The most 
convincing piece of theory is the tax-based argument (Black 1980; Tepper 
1981), which essentially maintains that 100% of the fund’s investments 
should be in the most heavily taxed asset, in this case presumably bonds. 
Note that this theory tells us only that the asset allocation should be an 
extreme choice. It does not predict what the cross-sectional empirical 
results presented in Friedman’s chapter should look like. Indeed, we do 
not need cross-sectional results to test the tax-based theory. We know 
that very few firms invest their pension funds exclusively in bonds. To  the 
contrary, most firms maintain a mixed portfolio, often weighted some- 
what more heavily toward equities. Thus, very simple and well-known 
evidence shows that tax-based theories do not explain actual pension 
fund allocations. 
To structure a theory-based hypothesis for the cross-sectional results, 
we  must construct an augmented theory which states why firms might 
depart from the tax-based all-bonds strategy. The most likely candidate 
for such an augmented theory is the joint consideration of  tax factors and 
the value of  the put to the PBGC. (Friedman calls this latter effect the 
“Sharpe hypothesis. ”) For example, we might hypothesize that firms for 
whom the PBGC put is more valuable (that is, more in the money) will 
hold more of  the most volatile asset, presumably common stocks, and 
vice versa.’ The PBGC put is likely to be more valuable for underfunded 
plans, for unprofitable companies or companies with high profit variabil- 
ity, or  for companies with more debt. We would thus expect the following 
kinds of  companies to hold more common stocks in their pension port- 
folios: companies with underfunded pension plans, less profitable com- 
panies, companies with higher earnings variability, and companies with 
more debt. 
Unfortunately, the actual  empirical  results  confirm  none of  these 
hypotheses, as Friedman’s excellent discussion points out. Surprisingly, 
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allocation of assets within the fund.’ There was a significant correlation of 
asset allocation with the other variables, but the opposite of that hypothe- 
sized  above. In short, less profitable companies with  more debt and 
higher earnings variability tended to  hold somewhat less common stock in 
their pension funds, not more. 
Why  is  that? The empirical  results  are consistent  with  a  “risk- 
offsetting story,” rather than with the theory discussed above. Corpora- 
tions seem to manage their pension fund asset allocations to counterbal- 
ance the risks stemming from product markets  or  financial structure, so as 
to more nearly equalize total risk across firms at any given point in time. 
To  some  extent, this large sample result merely confirms anecdotal advice 
that can often be overheard from pension officers; namely, the riskier the 
company, the safer the pension fund should be. It is not at all clear, 
however,  whether it  is  risk  to the company,  or to the pension  be- 
neficiaries, or to the agents themselves (i.e., the pension officers) that 
decision makers endeavor to offset, though these are all affected by the 
asset choice. Nonetheless,  this empirical study demonstrates that risk 
offsetting appears to be a central feature of asset allocation. 
Pension Funding and Capital Structure 
The other results I will  discuss here are the observed relationships 
between  the degree  of  pension  funding,  capital structure, and  other 
attributes of  the firm. I have two small but nagging concerns about this set 
of results. 
First, the measures of funding that are used are derived from the item 
“Accrued Liabilities”  reported  on  Schedule  B, Form  5500, entitled 
“Actuarial Information.” It is  not clear to me that this definition of 
pension liabilities is really measuring what one might first imagine, and 
the labels and definitions here can be quite misleading. The structure of 
Schedule B suggests that this “accrued liabilities” item is the calculation 
used in determining the actual funding contributions for the plan, rather 
than, for example, the “actuarial  present value of  accumulated plan 
benefits” currently required by FASB 35. More particularly, “accrued 
liabilities” in the language of the actuary is often used to mean the  present 
value of what past contributions should have been had the current actuar- 
ial method, actuarial assumptions, and benefit levels been in effect during 
all past time periods. “Accrued liabilities” in this sense, when compared 
to the value of  the fund’s assets, determine the “unfunded liability,” the 
measure of  the extent to  which the fund’s assets are such that the pension 
fund is on the “funding trajectory” specified by the particular funding 
method. Unfortunately, however, this definition of  “accrued liabilities” 
is dependent on the funding method selected by the firm, as well as on the 
actuarial assumptions used (such as discount rate). Thus, two firms in the 
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substantially different “accrued liabilities,” and vice versa, introducing a 
source of  possible distortion in the data. Unfortunately, we do not know 
for sure what firms recorded under the item “accrued liabilities” on the 
Form 5500. The  pension liability information currently being reported for 
more recent years since introduction of the new FASB 35 will allow us to 
be more confident that we have a cross-sectionally consistent measure of 
pension liabilities. 
Second, several of  the empirical results reported by Friedman stem 
from regressions  where net worth  is  used  as the scale  (or deflating) 
variable. Clearly, because firms are quite different in size, some scaling is 
necessary. However, net worth is a relatively troublesome choice for this 
scale variable, for it is a residual quantity which can become quite small.’ 
It thus could possibly introduce  some spurious correlation into the regres- 
sion results.  Friedman’s note 14 suggests that he was sensitive to this 
potential problem and omitted some observations to attempt to limit its 
effect.  Nonetheless,  several of  the key  empirical  results  would  have 
reversed sign had another scale variable, other than net worth, been used 
(see Friedman’s notes 14 and 16). Given some  misgivings about net worth 
on a priori grounds, the sensitivity of results to the choice of scale variable 
is a little troubling. 
Having raised these two concerns, let me discuss the actual funding 
results. As  to  theory, the tax-based arguments would suggest that pension 
funds should always be as fully funded as possible, consistent of  course 
with IRS regulations. But to interpret cross-sectional tests, we once again 
need an augmented theory which  allows us to hypothesize  why firms 
might depart from policy of  full funding. The most likely candidate, as 
Friedman points out, is the put to the PBGC. A hypothesis stemming 
from  this  conjecture would  be that riskier  firms  should  have  bigger 
unfunded liabilities. Firms with low profitability, or variable profitability, 
might well be thought of  as riskier firms, and we might expect them to 
have bigger  unfunded  liabilities.  Unfortunately, the empirical  results 
(see, for example, table 5.7) suggest that this is not the case. Indeed, the 
results, while generally  not  statistically significant,  have the opposite 
sign. 
There is, however, one rather intriguing result here: the more debt a 
company has on its balance sheet, the larger its unfunded liabilities are. 
And there are several alternative explanations of  this result. First, and 
most simply, we can think of  unfunded liabilities as merely another form 
of corporate borrowing. When a company needs to borrow, we might 
argue, it tends to borrow in two ways: from the capital markets, which is 
shown on the balance sheet, and from its pension fund, which is shown as 
unfunded pension liabilities. 
Second, this  result  could  be interpreted, as Friedman  suggests,  as 
empirical support for the Sharpe hypothesis about the value of the PBGC 
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company has more debt, it tends to be managed somewhat more in the 
interests of  current (and possibly future) creditors. Stepping back from 
the problem for a moment, the tax-based arguments (Black 1980; Tepper 
1981) really just maintain that the interests of pension beneficiaries and 
shareholders are collinear. Ignoring the put to the PBGC, both of these 
groups want the pension fund fully funded and invested in bonds, the 
beneficiaries to maximize their collateral, and the shareholders to maxi- 
mize  their tax  benefits.  In whose  interests,  however,  would  it  be to 
underfund the plan? Who are the losers when we fully fund? The credi- 
tors are the most important set of apparent losers. By funding the pension 
liabilities, we collateralize these liabilities to  the detriment of liabilities of 
the company. Consequently, if  creditors could dictate corporate pension 
policy, they would clearly be interested  in underfunding the plan but 
investing the pension fund in bonds. Interestingly, what we observe in the 
empirical data is  that  the more debt a  company  has,  the bigger  its 
unfunded liabilities (table 5.7 and [17]) and the more bonds it holds in the 
pension fund (table 5.10). It is possible that we are observing an agency 
phenomenon here, reflecting the influence and interests of creditors on 
the financial policies of  highly leveraged companies. 
Conclusion 
Benjamin Friedman’s chapter in this volume has expanded our knowl- 
edge of  how companies actually manage their pension policies  and is 
therefore an important contribution.  We hope that future studies will 
pursue this same goal. 
For the present, however, we are left in a somewhat unsatisfactory 
state. The tax-based arguments of Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) sug- 
gest that firms should fully funa their pensions and invest the accumu- 
lated pension funds solely in bonds. Unfortunately, they do not. The 
Sharpe hypothesis suggests a rational economic reason why firms might 
be departing from these extremal policies: the value of  the put to the 
PBGC. Unfortunately, while several of the cross-sectional regressions 
reported in this chapter are consistent with this hypothesis, others are 
not. In short, our evolving theories of  pension policy and our evolving 
understanding of reality are at odds  with one another in several important 
respects. 
Notes 
1. This is an empirically testable proposition using cross-sectional regressions if firms 
adopt extremal asset allocations (as suggested by  Harrison and Sharpe) or if  they adopt 
interior mixed allocations-as,  in fact, we know they actually do. 
2.  See my later discussion of  the funding variable used in the data base. 
3.  “Net worth,” as defined by  Friedman, is not only net of corporate debt but net of 
unfunded pension liabilities as well (see eq. [ 2 ] ), so it can become quite small-indeed, 
conceivably negative. 152  Benjamin M. Friedman 
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